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HOW IS INDONESIA SETTING OUT ON THE ROAD TO UNIVERSAL COVERAGE?
The subsidised social health insurance for the poor in Indonesia was first 
introduced in 2005, initially referred to as Askeskin and subsequently, 
from 2008 onwards, as Jamkesmas. 
At the time, health coverage for civil servants and formal private sector 
employees had been in place for several decades. However, with roughly 
60 per cent of the labour force employed in the informal sector, a 
large part of the population was thereby left without cover. Askeskin-
Jamkesmas was a first attempt to bridge this gap by extending coverage 
to poor and near-poor households. Unlike formal sector social health 
insurance schemes, premiums for the poor and near-poor are fully 
subsidised from a tax-financed health fund. Enrolled households are 
entitled to comprehensive coverage for public healthcare, including 
inpatient and outpatient services.
The subsidised programme currently has a target population of about 76 
million people (about a third of the population) and a further 25 million 
are covered by the formal sector schemes. That said, this still leaves more 
than half the population without any form of health insurance.
Since 2006, in response to this persistent coverage gap, there has been 
a proliferation of local healthcare financing schemes. Collectively known 
as Jamkesda, these schemes are implemented and operated by district 
governments, and are often motivated by the local political context. 
Since Indonesia’s decentralisation in 2001, districts have been afforded a 
large degree of autonomy in setting local public health policy. Together 
with regional variation in financial and human resources, this process 
has led to substantial differences in the design of local schemes between 
districts, spanning factors such as coverage, benefit packages and 
provider contracting.
Q
A first step towards meeting Indonesia’s ambition for Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2019 was made in 2005, with the introduction of subsidised 
social health insurance for the poor. With the planned transition to UHC in mind, HEFPA has examined lessons that can be drawn from the experience of 
extending subsidised coverage to the poor.
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WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF COVERING THE POOR ON THEIR 
ACCESS TO CARE AND FINANCIAL PROTECTION? 
ACCESS TO CARE
The experience of the Askeskin programme has shown that subsidised 
social health insurance can be effective in increasing healthcare utilisation, 
especially in the poorest households.1 The bulk of the impact is on the use 
of public health centres in rural areas, and more expensive public hospitals 
and contracted private providers in urban areas. A factor that may have 
inhibited a broader impact among the poorest population has been the 
programme’s targeting performance. While the poor and near-poor were 
the main beneficiaries of Askeskin coverage, there was also considerable 
leakage to the non-poor.
Although the local government Jamkesda schemes have had little overall 
impact, they do seem to have contributed to closing the coverage gap, 
by increasing healthcare utilisation of the near-poor falling just outside 
the Askeskin-Jamkesmas target population.2 A 25 per cent increase in 
outpatient visits among the second poorest fifth of households can 
be attributed to Jamkesda schemes. However, there is no evidence 
of any effect for other income groups, and nor is there an impact on 
hospitalisations. Moreover, there is large variation in efficacy across 
districts, reflecting differences in design. The Jamkesda schemes that tend 
to increase healthcare utilisation typically rely on external management; 
they contract both public and private providers and prioritise basic 
services.
FINANCIAL PROTECTION
While Askeskin’s subsidised coverage for the poor has improved access, 
it has had a more ambiguous impact on financial protection. Out-of-
pocket healthcare spending was actually increased by the programme, in 
particular for urban households. This indicates that households may be 
bearing part of the cost of their increased utilisation of subsidised, but not 
fully insured, services. Nevertheless, the effect on utilisation is much larger 
than that on spending, suggesting a strong response of demand to the 
greater affordability of healthcare. Out-of-pocket spending on healthcare 
by Indonesian households has remained relatively low, accounting for 
approximately 2 per cent of household budgets, and the HEFPA study 
finds no conclusive evidence that Askeskin has led to an increased 
incidence of potentially financially deleterious healthcare spending. As 
with Askeskin, HEFPA found no evidence for a reduction in out-of-pocket 
spending among beneficiaries of Jamkesda schemes.
The financial protection from the risk of ill health offered by subsidised 
health insurance coverage of medical expenses is inevitably limited 
because it does not cover the other main source of economic risk from 
illness – income loss. Informal sector workers lack not only health 
insurance, but also go without sickness and disability insurance. The 
HEFPA study finds that an illness-induced income loss forces poor 
households to reduced consumption (especially for non-food items).3 
Although the poor tend to resort to borrowing and the sale of assets 
and savings as strategies for coping with the economic risk from ill 
health, these financial buffers are not sufficient to fully protect 
consumption levels in the short term. In addition, high interest rate 
borrowing, dissaving and productive asset depletion may negatively 
affect household consumption in the mid- and long terms.
Q
INCREASE IN OUTPATIENT CARE VISITS DUE TO ASKESKIN REDUCTION IN NON-FOOD CONSUMPTION DUE TO ILL HEALTH
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WHAT OBSTACLES STAND IN THE WAY OF INDONESIA ACHIEVING UHC? Q
The next phase of the reforms leading to UHC is to commence in 2014. 
Existing schemes are to be consolidated and scaled up in one nationwide 
social health insurance with mandatory contributions for formal sector 
workers and subsidised premiums targeted to the poor and near-poor.
Based on the experience with the Askeskin and Jamkesda schemes, 
one may expect that extending social health insurance coverage will 
improve both access and affordability of healthcare, but that gaps in 
financial protection may persist. The risk of illness-related income loss 
falls beyond the reach of social health insurance. Combined with the 
long-term economic consequences of exercising coping strategies such as 
borrowing and selling assets, uninsured income risk remains a source of 
potential impoverishment.
Most income risk is borne by the informal sector that harbours the 
bulk of the labour force from the poorest half of the population. An 
additional problem is that the roadmap for achieving UHC by 2019 is 
currently unclear on how the large share of Indonesians that neither 
qualify for subsidised premiums nor receive coverage through formal 
sector employment will be covered. This group comprises a third of the 
population, largely overlapping with the currently uninsured. 
The provision of full financial protection for ill health would therefore 
require a further expansion of insurance to the informal sector, as well 
as considering broader social security policies that go beyond the 
UHC agenda, and comprehensively addressing the multiple sources of 
economic risk from ill health. 
HOW THE FINDINGS WERE OBTAINED
The impact analysis of Askeskin was based on a nationally 
representative dataset of households that were surveyed in both 
2005 and 2006 (Susenas). The 2005 survey was conducted just prior 
to the introduction of Askeskin, providing a national baseline for 
the analysis. The impact of the Askeskin insurance on healthcare 
utilisation and out-of-pocket spending was then estimated by 
comparing differences between the Askeskin insured and non-
insured, both before and after the programme was introduced. This 
comparison enabled the construction of a counterfactual scenario of 
how the Askeskin insured would have fared in the event they had not 
been targeted by the scheme.
The analysis of the economic risk from illness is drawn from a similar 
panel of households, but for the period 2002 to 2004. Besides 
detailed income and expenditure data, this survey also recorded 
information on ill health events and the coping strategies that 
households resorted to in response. This data allows us to estimate 
the effects of ill health on food- and non-food consumption, as well as 
exploring the role of out-of-pocket health spending and income loss 
as channels for economic risk.
The Jamkesda study is based on a district survey of local health 
financing schemes. Using a combination of a survey by mail and 
interviews by telephone, detailed information on local health 
financing schemes was collected from District Health Offices in 262 
districts. This information was combined with the annual Susenas 
cross section surveys for 2004 to 2010, which are representative at the 
district level. This allowed us to track average healthcare utilisation 
and OOP spending in districts over time, and assess how these were 
affected by the Jamkesda schemes.
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